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In November 2009, under the auspices of Václav Klaus, President of the Czech 
Republic, the Faculty of Finance and Accounting at the University of Economics 
in Prague and the Czech National Bank organized the conference “Twenty Years of 
Financial and Bank Reforms in the Czech Republic”. In three consecutive blocks, the 
conference was aimed at the fundamental economic and ﬁ  nancial reforms, central and 
commercial banking system and development of capital market in this country.
In his speech President Václav Klaus described the main contours of the 
transformation process. He accentuated that the transformation steps had not been 
taken in a vacuum: there existed internal political pressures, later foreign economic 
actors and lobbyists exerted their inﬂ  uence. Mr. Klaus emphasized that unlike the 
other transforming countries the rehabilitation of the banking sector in Czechoslovakia 
was not done through inﬂ  ationary depreciation of credits and deposits. In fact, the 
preparation of a crucial reform of the banking system started before November 1989 
because the splitting of a monobank into commercial banks, which really occurred in 
1990, had already been prepared.
The banking sector rehabilitation could not be considered as an outright priority 
because the banks had to “breathe” with economy. a  decisive way of ensuring 
competition among banks was to allow the entry of the new economic actors into 
an emerging sector of real commercial banking. The German model of universal 
banks was preferred to the U.S. model. What was retrospectively underestimated was 
the aggressive development and inﬂ  uence of ﬁ  nancial intermediation in the form of 
funds or foreign investment banks. From the aspect of monetary policy the monetarist 
doctrine was preferred while according to Mr. Klaus the policy was to be strict in the 
initial phase (and it really was) with a gradual relief in the second phase. However, Mr. 
Klaus is convinced that the actual monetary policy in this country was too strict in the 
years 1996-2002 and the jump tightening of bank regulation in 1997 and 1998 was a big 
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mistake. The increase in the volume of bad credits in that period was a consequence of 
recession, not its cause.
The determination of the moment of the ﬁ  xed exchange rate abandonment was an 
important uncertainty in monetary policy. Similarly, it was difﬁ  cult to determine the 
moment of ﬂ  ow liberalization on the capital (today the so called ﬁ  nancial) account of 
balance of payments. The capital account liberalization was forced by our effort to 
join the OECD and Mr. Klaus is not sure if it was not done very soon. The exchange 
rate liberalization was forced by the currency crisis in 1997 while the government 
previously urged the CNB to make liberalization sooner.
In the beginnings of transformation the most violent disputes were about the rate 
of the Czechoslovak koruna devaluation. Whereas the International Monetary Fund 
enforced higher devaluation, domestic critics wanted much lower devaluation. Until 
now Mr. Klaus has considered the rate of devaluation adopted at the end of 1990 as one 
of the most difﬁ  cult political decisions that has ever been made. Finally, the exchange 
rate outlasted more than six years, which was a record result among the transforming 
countries!
Another dispute was about the character of our banking system in the nineties and is 
connected with the term “bank socialism”. According to Mr. Klaus it is only a political 
label and not the analysis of the actual situation because nobody has ever dictated any 
credits to anybody. Mr. Klaus believes that bad credits were partly a legacy of the past 
and partly an inevitable product of transformation. Banks surely made great mistakes, 
but in Klaus’s opinion they were not greater than the mistakes made by U.S. banks in 
recent years. According to Mr. Klaus the cheap sale of banks after recession in 1997 
and 1998 to foreign investors was a fantastic success of foreign lobbyists and advisors. 
Mr. Klaus is convinced that the currency separation in 1993, which was performed 
shortly after the Czechoslovak federation was split, was successful. The separation 
is, however, instructive from the aspect that the existence of common currency is not 
only the question of intention or political will but it is mainly the question of economic 
parameters. And it also furnishes an instructive lesson for our heading to another 
monetary union, i.e. to the euro area.
In conclusion president Václav Klaus stated that although the Czech economy was 
experiencing deep recession, the banking and ﬁ  nancial systems were built on good 
foundations. And it is not so little at all.
Klaus’s contribution was followed by Panel I „Twenty Years of Financial and 
Monetary Reforms in the Czech Republic“, chaired by Vladimír Tomšík. The ﬁ  rst 
panellist was Pavel Kysilka, who was one of the actors of the currency separation. 
The monetary union between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic was very 
delicate from the very beginning. Mr. Kysilka recalled the statement of Jan Stráský, 
the last federal prime minister, who said that the monetary union would not last longer 
than by the “plum-picking time”. But this forecast turned out to be too optimistic 
because the monetary union did not survive its ﬁ  rst phase, the phase of elementary 
trust. Main arguments against the monetary union of the newly emerged independent 
states were the expectations that the Slovak party would lose the pace of reform and 
would slacken the ﬁ  scal policy. Economic agents did not believe in the vitality of the 
monetary union, and as a depreciation of the future Slovak currency was expected, 
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trust it was not possible to maintain the monetary union. Moreover, during negotiations 
about the currency separation the Slovak party appeared not only to prefer their own 
currency but also to show better preparedness in the area of its real introduction.
According to Mr. Kysilka, the Czech koruna itself has attained a good position 
during its 17-year existence. In 1997 it underwent only a temporary 10% weakening, 
but in the long run it is an extraordinarily successful currency. After a decrease in 
inﬂ  ation and nominal interest rates it became a ﬁ  nancing tool for foreign investors. 
Consequently, the success of the Czech currency evokes a relatively low appetite of 
the population for the adoption of the single European currency.
Martin Mandel discussed some general problems from the aspect of monetary 
macroeconomics. Having shortly recalled the latest monetary development he focused 
on selected current problems of monetary policy. Taking into account the present regime 
of monetary policy (inﬂ  ation targeting) the credibility of the central bank is a crucial 
issue. Mr. Mandel tested the credibility of CNB through inﬂ  ationary expectations 
of the ﬁ  nancial market. If these expectations were not inﬂ  uenced by the targets and 
prognoses of CNB, but by the past actual inﬂ  ation, it would imply that the central 
bank is not credible. An empirical analysis showed that inﬂ  ationary expectations are 
explained by the current prognosis and inﬂ  ation target for the most part while the past 
inﬂ  ation (its inﬂ  uence indicates the presence of adaptive expectations) inﬂ  uences the 
expectations surprisingly weakly.
Another frequently discussed problem of the present monetary policy is the real 
independence of interest rate policy on interest rate decisions of the ECB. Obviously, 
the coefﬁ  cient of correlation between Czech and European monetary-policy rates 
gradually increased. It is possible to refuse by the Granger causality test that ECB 
would not inﬂ  uence Czech interest rates.
Finally, the last discussed problem was a  question whether the real effective 
exchange rate of the koruna is a stabilization rather than destabilization element in our 
convergence process. Based on VAR model and cointegration analysis Mr. Mandel 
drew a conclusion that the effective exchange rate was a stabilization element. There 
is a dispute about the fact whether this positive role of exchange rate development is 
not overshadowed by its excessive medium-term volatility due to “destabilization” 
speculation.
Vladimír Dlouhý chose the adoption of the euro in the Czech Republic from an 
economist’s point of view as the subject of his contribution (on the contrary, Miroslav 
Kalousek, who presented the subsequent contribution, discussed the same theme from 
a politician’s point of view). Based on statistical data, Vladimír Dlouhý described the 
hitherto economic development in the Eurozone. During the ten years of the Eurozone 
existence there was an explicit convergence of inﬂ  ation rates in the member countries, 
and naturally interest rates also converged to each other. The results from the aspect 
of real economy are not so unambiguous; similarly, according to Vladimír Dlouhý, 
neither is the expected inﬂ  uence on the deepening of international trade within the euro 
area quite signiﬁ  cant. It is to note that the present deep crisis is a real test of EMU. It 
showed that the ﬁ  scal coordination was negligible and that the EMU would necessarily 
face divergent tendencies of economic development in the particular countries.
As concerns the potential joining of the Czech Republic the euro area, Mr. Dlouhý 
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seen in the inﬂ  uence of asymmetric external shocks. As for the timing of joining the 
euro area Mr. Dlouhý considers the year 2014 as an opportune date of the adoption 
of single currency if the accession criteria are not changed. It should afford sufﬁ  cient 
freedom to Czech economic policy in the years to come when short-term shocks cannot 
be fully excluded.
 Miroslav Kalousek dealt with the same theme as Vladimír Dlouhý, but he spoke 
as a politician. He did not answer the question whether to adopt the euro or not, but 
when it should be adopted. Mr. Kalousek is convinced that it cannot be otherwise if we 
want to respect the agreements. According to Mr. Kalousek, the euro area has proved 
its vitality in the course of the current crisis. Unlike the past episodes, the domestic 
market did not undergo any disruptive exchange rate crises that brought shocks into 
mutual trade. Mr. Kalousek does not consider a possibility of weakening the national 
currency during crisis as a fair instrument of economic policy. In his opinion, the 
intentionally weakened exchange rate is hardly different in its consequences from 
general export subsidy and general import charge, which are the instruments the EU 
member country should not use against its business partners that were also hit by the 
crisis. Mr. Kalousek also strongly opposes to any softening of accession criteria. He 
recognizes that their present form is outdated and does not have a substantial economic 
support, but the opening of a new debate about them does not guarantee that new 
criteria would be better. Mr. Kalousek believes that at the present time the effort aimed 
at the adoption of the euro is identical to the effort aimed at the credible consolidation of 
public ﬁ  nance. In his opinion, other fears from the adoption of the euro are secondary. 
In a subsequent block – Panel II “Twenty Years of Banking System in the Czech 
Republic”, chaired by Petr Dvořák – the speakers devoted their contributions to 
development of the commercial  Jiří Kunert summarized the short, but very rich in 
events, history of commercial banking since the beginning of reforms. His view on 
bank development was sharply different in many aspects from Václav Klaus’s view. 
The role of bank credits was absolutely crucial due to the chronic undercapitalization 
of former state enterprises and because new ﬁ  rms were practically beginning from 
zero. Unlike the advanced economies, according to Mr. Kunert the low capital 
resources of ﬁ  rms caused that credits assumed the character of risky capital invested 
in business. The severance of commercial banks from the former Czechoslovak State 
Bank was the ﬁ  rst step to establish a banking sector. However, newly emerged large 
banks had certain monopoly advantages that enabled their transformation to ordinary 
banks and favoured them in comparison with new small banks. New Czech banks 
were established with borrowed money, they did not have either good facilities or top 
management. According to Mr. Kunert, being corrupted by high salaries and luxurious 
cars managers in small banks countenanced how shareholders used the bank resources 
for their own needs. Mr. Kunert is convinced that the partial privatization of banks 
by the voucher method with the holding of the government’s controlling stake was 
a mistake. In Mr. Kunert’s opinion, Czech banks were to be sold to foreign investors as 
quickly as possible because then there would be a greater pressure on the appropriate 
allocation of credits. 
As for bank supervision, Mr. Kunert said that it only rather caught up with banks due 
to the very dynamic development of bank services. However, the supervision is currently 
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especially in other countries. Mr. Kunert is convinced that the regulation is sufﬁ  cient. 
The problem was that this regulation was not performed duly. The future development of 
the banking system will bring about a return to the previous state, its deglobalization and 
reregulation. Banking business will be governed by the client’s centricity.
Miroslav Singer spoke in detail about the connection between bank supervision 
and macroeconomic development. After a brief survey of economic development in the 
mid-nineties he analyzed in greater detail the double crisis in 1997 and 1998 – banking 
sector crisis and currency crisis and related economic recession. As for the bank crisis, 
Mr. Singer considers the postponement of privatization of large banks beyond the 
period 1994-1995 as a mistake. According to his estimation, this postponement cost 
the economy about 15% of the then annual GDP. Moreover, jump depreciation of the 
exchange rate and dramatic increase in interest rates caused a shock the size of which 
is not usually simulated in stress tests of banks. Currency crisis and real economy crisis 
were caused by the underestimation of risks ensuing from economy overheating and 
by a failure to manage the exit strategy from the ﬁ  xed exchange rate.
Within ten years since the crisis there has been a radical improvement both in the 
domestic banking sector and in the macroeconomic framework. The banking sector 
in Czech economy is not a source of shocks; on the contrary, it is buffering them. 
Mr. Singer is convinced that the transfer of supervision to the pan-European level 
without being accompanied by the respective ﬁ  scal or tax responsibility may be a risk 
for ﬁ  nancial stability.
Michal Mejstřík dealt with the position of Czech banks in the framework of regional 
consolidators. He recalled that Czech banks were fully integrated into the groups of 
large foreign banking houses – 97% of the balance sheet total of the Czech banking 
sector was controlled by foreign banks in 2008. The extent of bank intermediation has 
been increasing in the Czech Republic but it is still far from being at the usual level 
of the countries of West Europe. It means that the banks in this country (similarly like 
in the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe) have a great growth potential. 
The present crisis and related changes in the banking system in other countries will 
substantially inﬂ  uence the banking sector in this country because of the interconnection 
of Czech banks with West European ﬁ  nancial groups. During the crisis the large banks 
appeared not to be willing to take the downside risk. According to Mr. Mejstřík, one of 
the methods of preventing the doctrine “too-big-to-fail” is to segment the big actors so 
that it will be possible to divide them quickly in the case of fall.
Kamil Janáček illustrated development of the Czech banking system on an example 
of Komerční banka. This commercial bank started its activity with ten personal 
computers and mainly with the portfolio of loans, 85% of which would be classiﬁ  ed 
as doubtful or loss according to the present criteria. However, the dynamic growth of 
demand for bank services and favourable interest spreads enabled the bank to create 
sufﬁ  cient rectifying items and reserves and to show a proﬁ  t by the year 1997. It was 
also typical of the other large Czech banks. Similarly like in the other banks there was 
a rapid increase in unpaid loans in 1997 and Komeční banka was heavily afﬂ  icted by 
the jump measure of the CNB taken in 1998, which required 100% loan loss reserves 
that were secured by immovables. This measure was introduced at the least opportune 
moment and Mr. Janáček is convinced that it contributed to the credit crunch of Czech 
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and more obvious that the bank would be unsalable without the rehabilitation of its 
portfolio. According to Mr. Janáček, in spite of considerable recovery costs the net 
yield from the ownership and sale of Komerční banka was positive for the government. 
Contrary to Mr. Kunert, Mr. Janáček believes that from the very beginning it was not 
possible to privatize 100% of banks by foreign capital. This capital always aimed at 
precisely selected companies while large banks were not within its focus by the end 
of the nineties. 
Mr. Janáček said that besides undisputable beneﬁ  ts the transformation had its costs 
and it was logical that a part of them was imposed in the banking sector. Compared to 
the other post-communist countries these costs were among the lowest.
The last block of the conference – Panel III “Twenty Years of Capital Market in 
the Czech Republic”, chaired by Petr Musílek – was devoted to the development of 
the capital market in the Czech Republic. Taking into account its speciﬁ  c features the 
speakers dealt with legal regulations of its functioning and historical development of 
legislation in this area in this country. Jan Dědič was the ﬁ  rst speaker who recalled the 
old Roman-law principle: the more corrupt the state, the more laws it needs. Another 
Roman-law principle is that laws should be simple so that even inexperienced people 
could remember them. However, today’s tendency towards more detailed regulation 
is in contradiction with this principle. The original regulation of capital market by the 
Securities Act having about forty paragraphs was enlarged to more than 200 paragraphs 
in the current Act on Capital Market Activities. The rules are often changed, and 
they are very detailed. It holds good that the more detailed the rules, the easier their 
circumvention. Mr. Dědič is convinced that the Czech Republic would currently need 
stabilization and transparency of law in the area of capital market.
In Mr. Dědič’s opinion the legal regulation of capital market should be based on 
fundamental principles to a larger extent. It does not make any sense to deﬁ  ne duties 
that cannot be supervised by the state. The basic assumption of the actual functioning 
of regulation is that the regulated actors will identify themselves with a regulatory 
provision and will understand its purpose. An emphasis on the detailed and minute 
regulation of capital market is typical of continental Europe and logically inﬂ  uences 
the Czech law. However, we should think over such development and judge whether 
a further regulation of the rights and duties of actors in capital market does not restrain 
them to such an extent that could consequently eliminate any capital market completely 
in the Czech Republic. 
A contribution presented by Tomáš Ježek, who mainly spoke about the situation in 
capital market before the Securities Commission was founded, was very critical. In the 
beginning, the legislation was indifferent towards the regulation of secondary market, 
insider trading, self-trading, etc. a large number of companies privatized by the voucher 
method were accepted ex offo to the secondary market that had very low liquidity and 
the quotations of which were easy to manipulate. In addition, the companies did not 
perform their information duties. In 1997 a delisting of 1,400 companies was done, 
many of them changed their shares to a physical form, which resulted in non-transparent 
ownership. Mr. Ježek considers the then Act on Investment Funds from 1992 as heavily 
defective because it elevated the manager of the fund to the position of its owner. Due 
to a negligent approach of the Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic (the then 
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ofﬁ  cers saw that the capital market did not have a future without tough and respected 
supervision and so the stock exchange itself would not have a chance to exist any longer. 
The stock exchange executive ofﬁ  cers set a paradoxical task – they were interested in 
the origination of an authority they would themselves be subjected to. But the Ministry 
of Finance originally opposed the foundation of the Securities Commission, according 
to Mr. Ježek its top representatives pushed through a false and dangerous theory that 
the capital market should be left without supervision and regulation at least until the 
capital concentration was accomplished. Mr. Ježek is convinced that this theory was 
a result of the so called false liberalism when the government erroneously considered 
the resultant capital concentration as a higher value than the voluntariness of property 
transfer is. After the Securities Commission started to work, relicensing of traders in 
securities was gradually performed, information duty was done better and share funds 
were opened.
In conclusion, Tomáš Ježek stated that the use of capital market on a large scale 
could not be a result of nothing smaller than profound and gradual changes in the 
nation’s ﬁ  nancial culture.
The tone of Petr Koblic’s contribution was also critical as he considered the absence 
of domestic investors as a crucial problem of the Czech stock exchange. It culminated 
at the turn of 2000 and 2001 and according to Mr. Koblic it resulted from the absolute 
disillusion of domestic investors from developments in the second half of the nineties. 
Out of the initial almost 6 million potential investors – “voucher shareholders” – by 
2001 there remained hardly two thousand small investors who regularly traded. The 
share of domestic institutional investors also developed in a nonstandard way – their 
share is currently only about 5%, which is unfortunately a very low percentage in 
regional comparison.
At the present time, small domestic investors return to the market and account for 
up to 20% of the volume of dealings. Mr. Koblic ascribes this new trend to statutory 
compulsory repurchase, relicensing of funds and traders in securities, improved 
supervision,  etc. According to stock exchange estimations the number of small 
investors has increased 30 times in the last eight years but it is still incomparably 
smaller than in Austria and economies of comparable size.
Mr. Koblic stated that he did not fear about the capital market development in 
the Czech Republic very much but there are many areas where improvements could 
be made. E.g. the fact that all issues of IPO are organized by the artiﬁ  cially founded 
mother in the Netherlands or Luxembourg proves that all issuers want to avoid Czech 
justice, administrative bodies, Czech law, which is not surely a satisfactory situation.
The last speaker in this block and at the conference was Dušan Tříska, whose speech 
largely opposed especially Tomáš Ježek’s opinions. Mr. Tříska considers the Securities 
Commission as a principal enemy and today’s legislation in the area of capital market 
as so to say worse than in the beginnings of transformation. Mr. Tříska is an advocate 
of voucher privatization, not only of its beginnings but also of all subsequent action. In 
his contribution he dealt in greater detail with the problem of investment privatization 
funds. He recalled the absolutely fascinating rate (from the current aspect) of adopted 
changes: e.g. only 107 days elapsed between the publication of the “Procedure for the 
Foundation of Investment Privatization Funds” and the deadline of the acceptance of 
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attitude to the institute of investment privatization funds was critical, besides other 
things, because there does not exist a way of guaranteeing the credibility of investment 
privatization funds. According to Mr. Tříska, the concentration of property rights 
should not have been realized a priori within the investment privatization funds but ex 
post, i.e. in the secondary share market. But it was clear already in autumn 1990 that for 
political reasons some intermediaries had to be included in the voucher privatization 
scheme. The role of investment privatization funds was further complicated by the 
fact that the EU experts showed the inability to distinguish the standard institutions 
of collective investment from privatization funds that were intended to have quite 
a different function (corporate governance in a privatized company). The result was 
quite an erroneous restriction of the percentage share the privatization funds could 
hold in one privatized company. The economic community’s opinions could however 
be heard only when they did not collide with the political agreement. According to Mr. 
Tříska it could happen that some rational opinions had to be sacriﬁ  ced in favour of 
progress. Mr. Tříska also recalled that thanks to voucher privatization it was possible 
to explain the most important institutions of market economy to the population at large.
In general, the conference showed that the short history of economic reforms, 
reforms of the banking system and ﬁ  nancial markets in the Czech Republic was very 
rich in events the interpretation of which has become the object of many debates 
and disputes until now. These debates, different opinions or even disputes are 
very interesting not only from historical aspects but also from the aspect of future 
development. Nowadays it is not clear in what direction the capital market regulation 
will or should proceed nor is the method and mode of bank regulation evident. Finally, 
apparently historical considerations about the opportune timing of abandonment of the 
ﬁ  xed exchange rate or about the short existence of the Czech-Slovak monetary union 
are very instructive for current practical economic policy and for the future of Czech 
economy as a whole.